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Real Property

By George A. Pindar*

One who reads the judicial output of Georgia's appellate courts for the
past decade can certainly be impressed with the high quality of the writing often found in these pages. We can understand why much of it goes
unnoticed on the national scene, since other courts and law teachers are
programmed by long tradition to look largely to the Northeastern States
for legal scholarship.1 But we now find a stirring trend toward more progressive thinking and impatience with outworn platitudes in both appellate courts, as illustrated in some of the rulings discussed below."
I.

ACTIONs FOR LAND -

PROCEDURE

Can the Georgia Legislature create a right enforceable only in its own
courts, so that federal courts have no jurisdiction to enforce it? The principle is well established that no state may create a substantive right by
statute and withdraw its enforcement from federal cognizance. In FDIC v.
* Partner in Gershon, Ruden, Pindar & Olim, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (J.D.,
1927). Member of the State Bar of Georgia and the American Bar Association. Author of
GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW & PROCEDURE (1971) (2nd Ed. 1979) and AMERICAN REAL ESTATE
LAW (1976).
1. While we no longer have the brilliant writing of Lumpkin and Bleckley, nor the real
property expertise of Jenkins and Atkinson, there is much less provincialism and considerably more awareness of how other jurisdictions deal with similar problems. However, it remains true that the citation of Georgia cases nationally is low; for example, we find on a
quick check of the last five volumes of A.L.R. 3d only one Georgia case.
2. Special attention is called to cases discussed hereinafter under the headings Easements, Land Litigation, Estates, Mortgages and Zoning. Yet, after all, the purpose of written opinions is debatable. In most of the civilized world, that is, in Civil Law countries,
judges have long been "forbidden, when giving judgment in the cases which are brought
before them, to lay down general rules of conduct or decide a case by holding it was governed by a previous decision." NAPOLEONIC CODE, PRELIMINARY TITLE, Article 5. In fact,
most legal writing in Civil Law countries is done by university professors, although there are
exceptions; but the Anglo-American system demands that our judges (at least the appellate
judges) give reasons for their judgments.
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Windland Co.,8 the question was whether the principle was violated by
Georgia Code Ann. section 67-1503," which requires that confirmation of
nonjudicial foreclosure sales be made only in the superior courts of Georgia, on pain of forfeiture of all claim for deficiency judgment on the mortgage debt. Appellant, a federal corporation, obtained a decree of confirmation in the United States District Court, then sued for deficiency
judgment in the state court. Defendant contended that the statute specified the superior court for all confirmation proceedings, and that the statute did not, and could not, confei jurisdiction on the federal courts for
that purpose. The effect of such a position, however, would be to legislate
the jurisdictional limits of the national judiciary. It would, in effect, deny
full faith and credit to the federal court judgment.5 The Georgia Supreme
Court therefore construed the local statute as permitting federal courts to
exercise the same jurisdiction conferred upon the superior court, since
any other construction would have rendered it unconstitutional.
Under the 1976 Georgia Constitution, "cases respecting titles to land
shall be tried in the county where the land lies."' In Lake Lanier Island
Development Authority v. Village Harbor, Inc.,7 the Authority brought
suit to terminate a lease and regain possession of the land. The suit was
filed in the county in which the land was located, according to the 1966
Quiet Title Act. The court of appeals, after a transfer from the supreme
court, ruled that such an action was not one involving title to land, and
must be brought in the county of the defendant's residence. The controlling issue, said the court, is not who has title to the land, but whether the
lease is enforceable, and if so whether it has been terminated by defaults
alleged to be chargeable against the defendant. The case is similar to
other rulings dealing with actions to cancel deeds (which are regarded as
in personam, not in rem), to establish a right of foreclosure,' or other
cases where a grant of affirmative equitable relief is necessary to establish
the plaintiffs title.10
Can the filing of a lis pendens be the basis of an action for damages by
3. 245 Ga. 194, 264 S.E.2d 11 (1980).
4. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1503 (1977).
5. Without in any way questioning the correctness of the holding, we may find it interesting to look back to Goodman v. Vinson, 142 Ga. App. 420, 236 S.E.2d 153 (1977) (see
discussion in Pindar, Real Property, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 30 MERCER L. REv.
167, 206 (1978)) invalidating a confirmation proceeding filed with the clerk but not reported
directly to the superior court judge as literally required in the statute. In that case the court
regarded the proceeding as not in the court or its clerk, but one before the judge personally.
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4302 (1977).
7. 152 Ga. App. 705, 264 S.E.2d 23 (1979).
8. Martin v. Bennett, 221 Ga. 482, 145 S.E.2d 517 (1965).
9. Graham v. Tallent, 235 Ga. 47, 218 S.E.2d 799 (1975).
10. Cochran v. Groover, 156 Ga. 323, 118 S.E. 865 (1923).
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the owner of the property described, and thus regarded as a disparagement of title under Georgia Code Ann. section 104-1411?" The question
was answered for the first time in Georgia in Berger v. Shea.'" Plaintiff
made no claim as to the allegations of the complaint itself, which were
specifically privileged under Georgia Code Ann. section 105-711." Other
states have ruled on the question, taking the view that the lis pendens
notice is no more than a required republication of the allegations of the
pleadings."' The Georgia court agreed.
Those who think of equitable jurisdiction as static should watch the
trend of Georgia cases culminating in McGhee v. Brown." Chancery
courts long ago assumed the power to partition estates between cotenants,
by division in kind or by outright sale if the property could not be equitably divided. There is all the more reason for such a sale in cases of life
estates and remainders, principally for the reason that a life estate is inherently unmarketable: no one will buy it alone for the erection of improvements or long-term occupancy because it may be unexpectedly terminated at any time. Yet when combined with a remainder, a life estate
becomes a perfect title. If the life tenant is old and feeble, so as to be
unable to maintain a large farm or business property, and the remaindermen, even though known and sui juris, are unreasonably uncooperative, a
court of equity becomes the only solution for the problem. Georgia courts,
like those in other American states, first assumed jurisdiction of such
cases only where the remaindermen were persons unborn or under disability. The supreme court has said that in the case of vested remainders
the probate court has jurisdiction, 6 failing to consider the fact that such
a court can act only while the estate is being administered before it. More
recent cases have been groping toward an expansion of equity jurisdiction
already taking place in other states. In Williams v. Colleran, the life
tenant was old and in bad health; the property could not be used or
rented in its present condition; and financing for its improvement was
unobtainable because no lender would accept a mere life interest as security. The tenant asked the court for a judicial sale to give her the value of
her life estate, protecting the remainder interest. The remainderman was
alive, competent, and vocally obstructive, contending that such relief was
obtainable only where the remainder is contingent, or where cotenancy is

11.
12.
13.

GA. CODE ANN. 104-1411 (1968).
150 Ga. App. 812, 258 S.E.2d 621 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. 105-711 (1968).

14. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal.2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956), a position also followed in
Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, and Texas.
15. 244 Ga. 478, 260 S.E.2d 873 (1979).
16. Calhoun v. Thompson, 171 Ga. 286, 155 S.E. 183 (1930).
17. 230 Ga. 56, 195 S.E.2d 413 (1973).
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involved. The court rejected the argument, stating there was no difference
in principle and the interest of a vested remainder is no greater than a
contingent one. The subject cam6 up again in Billings v. Billings;18 but
now the life tenant asked for partition, having also acquired an 87.8%
interest in the remainder. The partition statutes failed to cover the situation, but the court sent the case back for further consideration, pointing
out that the plaintiff may be able to prove a necessity for present sale and
division if her present incomplete title could not be adequately marketed
without a sacrifice. In McGhee v. Brown,19 the life tenant's counterclaim,
asking for a sale and division of proceeds, was rejected in a short opinion
on the basis that merely acquiring a part interest in the remainder is no
ground for such relief, although the remedy is available "in the proper
circumstances.' 0 Under the previous authorities, the court probably
should have retained the counterclaim to enable such circumstances to be
shown, but the broad principle is again recognized. The persistence of the
misnomer of "partition" is conspicuous throughout the Georgia cases.
The crux of the cases is the ancient power of equity to convert reality into
personalty whenever the circumstances require." It should also be noted
that in the proposed Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act
(USOLTA), section 2-205 authorizes a court to permit the sale, encumbrance of'leasing of land subject to a future interest, whenever found to
be in the interest of the parties involved.
Equity jurisdiction over partition is another subject of growth in the
thinking of Georgia courts. There has been a heavy casualty of cases dismissed because they attempted to proceed in equity although partition at
law would have been adequate. Saffold v. Anderson" is a typical example. Another more recent case is Cashin v. Markwalter,2 where the court
denied an injunction against partition at law on various grounds. The
courts have finally realized that there can be only one form of action
under the Civil Practice Act,'" and no action should ever be dismissed
because it asks for equitable or legal relief or both.'" There is another
stumbling-block, however, that is frozen into the system by the Georgia
18. 242 Ga. 632, 250 S.E.2d 480 (1978) (noted in Pindar, Real Property,Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 31 MERCER L. REv. 189, 197 (1979)). Id. at 478, 260 S.E.2d at 873.
19. 244 Ga. at 478, 260 S.E.2d 873 (1979).
20. Id. at 478, 260 S.E.2d at 873.
21. Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill.
460, 49 N.E. 523 (1898); Ridley v. Halliday, 106 Tenn. 607,
61 S.W. 1025 (1901). See 51 Am. JUR. 2d Life Tenants and Remaindermen § 82 (1970).
Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1189 (1974).
22. 162 Ga. 408, 134 S.E. 81 (1926).
23. 208 Ga. 444, 67 S.E.2d 226 (1951), rev'd sub nom. Sikes v. Sikes, 233 Ga. 97, 209
S.E.2d 641 (1974).
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-102 (1977).
25. Sikes v. Sikes, 233 Ga. 97, 209 S.E.2d 641 (1974).
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Constitution, 6 which fixes the venue of equity cases as the county of residence of the defendant, while actions respecting title to land must be
brought in the county where the land lies.The result is that equitable partition may proceed only in the county of the defendant's residence, and
partition at law only where the land lies, and any attempt of the Civil
Practice Act to abolish the distinction would be unconstitutional.2 7 Actually, no constitution should be loaded down with such procedural niceties,
but it would be easy to amend by requiring that all partition proceedings,
legal or equitable, be brought in the county where the land lies.
II.

BEACHES

Although the taking of private property for roads and streets without
compensation is constitutionally prohibited, the claim of title by dedication is often asserted by the State or county authorities with the same
effect. In Lines v. State, 8 a similar claim was made to defeat private
ownership of beaches. The court points out that most claims of dedication involve land which has been improved at public expense for the public benefit. Here it was shown that while no improvements had been
made, there had been long-continued use by the public entering the land
for sunbathing, walking, drinking beer, and picnicing. The public authorities had placed removable trash receptacles and lifeguard stations at
some points, and the county had drained part of the land at the request
of the owners for health reasons. On the other hand, the landowners continued to occupy houses on part of the land, used other parts for access to
the ocean, erected trespassing signs, leased space for boat storage, mowed
grass, etc. Under all the facts, there was not sufficient evidence of implied
29
dedication within the established rules.
III.

COVENANTS

Who is entitled to enforce deed restrictions? The question often arises,
and In re Rivermist Homeowners Association,0 is one of the recent examples. A residential subdivision included thirty-three acres set aside for
26. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4302 to 4303 (1977).
27. See Burnham v. Lynn, 235 Ga. 207, 219 S.E.2d 111 (1975).
28. 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980).
29. See State ex. rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); Comment, The
Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J.
763 (1970); Wiel, Natural Communism: Air, Water, Oil, Sea, and Seashore, 47 HAM. L.
REV. 425, 450 (1934); Wolff, We Shall Fight Them on the Beaches, 247 HARPERS 55, 58
(1973); Degnan, Public Rights In Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription,24 SYRAcUsE L.
REV. 935 (1973).
30. 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979).
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recreational purposes, governed by a set of regulations providing that the
thirty-three acres should be deeded to and operated by a property owners
association. Such an association was thereafter organized and incorporated but no deed was ever made to it. The association brought a proceeding to quiet title under the 1966 Act,3 1 but the court upheld the trial
judge in ruling that it had no standing to sue because it had only an
expectancy, not a vested interest in the land. The case is similar to a
number of prior holdings that any action based upon a claim of present
title must fail if it appears that affirmative equitable relief is necessary.32
Such holdings must eventually yield to the most recent interpretations
of
33
the Civil Practice Act that there shall be one form of action only.
Most enforceable restrictions are incorporated into deeds and become a
3"
part of the chain of title. In Muldawer v. Stribling,
an independent
agreement was executed and recorded by adjoining landowners that restricted their lands to residential use. One of the parties to the agreement
conveyed to a limited partnership by a deed in which the grantee expressly agreed to be bound by the restrictions. That grantee conveyed to
a general partnership expressly subject to all outstanding "restrictions of
record," but the next deed, to an individual, contained no reference to
restrictions. The appellate court had apparently already decided that
under these facts the last owner, the individual, would not be bound by
the restrictions.3 ' In this case the parties were in privity of estate, and the
covenant touched and concerned the land, therefore he was bound by the
restriction, and an adjoining owner, who was not in the chain of title,
could enforce it as a third party beneficiary. There was one dissent and
one special concurrence.
In Corporationof the Presiding Bishop v. Statham, s it was contended
that the erection of a church was prohibited by covenants requiring not
less than 1600 square feet of "heated living area," and also providing that
no lot should be divided in any manner "but shall remain intact as a
single family residential unit"'7 except with the consent of the subdivider.
Here the court took a literal view of the provisions, and ruled that the
construction of the church should proceed so long as it would contain the

31.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 37-1407 to 1423 (1979).

32. McNeil v. Schwall, 236 Ga. 109, 223 S.E.2d 80 (1976); Manning v. Simmons, 207 Ga.
304, 61 S.E.2d 150 (1950); Burgess v. Simmons, 207 Ga. 291, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950); Howell v.
Ellsberry, 79 Ga. 475, 5 S.E. 96 (1888).
33. See notes 3 to 27 supra and accompanying text.
34. 243 Ga. 673, 256 S.E.2d 357 (1979).
35. See 31 MERCER L. Rav., supra, at 191, citing Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga. 23, 172
S.E.2d 421 (1970); But cf. Smith v. Gulf Refining Co., 162 Ga. 191, 134 S.E. 446 (1926).
36. 243 Ga. 448, 254 S.E.2d 833 (1979).
37. Id. at 448, 449, 254 S.E.2d at 834.
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required "heated living area in which someone resides. 3 8 Both the majority opinion and the dissent appeared to be impressed by the fact that if it
had been intended to confine the property to strictly residential use it
would have been easy to do so in the ordinary way.
There is a statute in Georgia under which "covenants restricting lands
to certain uses shall not run for more than 20 years .. ."89 in certain
areas. In Payne v. Borkat,'0 it was sought to apply this statute to a deed
covenant providing that no building shall be erected upon any lot except
for residence purposes. But other interested parties objected that such a
covenant is not one "restricting lands to certain uses" but constitutes
only what is known as a "building restriction." Examples of the distinction between use restrictions and building restrictions are plentiful, but in
the final analysis constructing a house on land is a "use" of the land,
whether the house is designed to remain there or to be sold and moved to
another site."' There are occasional situations where the true intent of the
parties may be shown to be otherwise; and public policy requires that
land be unrestricted except where clearly so intended. That is the view
adopted by the court. In the same case, the imposition of the twenty-year
limitation was attacked as an unwarranted interference with the right to
contract; however, the broad zoning powers given to municipalities and
counties under the Georgia constitution are said to override any objection
to impairment of contracts."

IV.

EASEMENTS

A problem of reading the subdivision map was involved in Hardigreev.
Hardigree."3 The plat showed a twenty-foot strip of land running from
the highway to Lot 23, between Lots 20 and 21. The court posed two
questions: whether "the representation of such parallel lines on a plat of
subdivision creates an easement by grant to adjacent owners? Can an
easement created by grant be lost by nonuser alone?""
Unquestionably, leaving a strip of land between two lots without more
does not create a street or alley," and even where the strip is marked
"reserved," an ambiguity may arise as to what was intended.' The opin38. Id. at 451, 254 S.E.2d at 835.
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 29-301 (Supp. 1979).
40. 244 Ga. 615, 261 S.E.2d 393 (1979).
41. For further discussion of this point, see 31 MERCER L. REV., supra, at 190, dealing
with Sissel v. Mith, 242 Ga. 595, 250 S.E.2d 463 (1978).
42. Rowland v. Kellos, 236 Ga. 799, 225 S.E.2d 302 (1976).
43. 244 Ga. 830, 262 S.E.2d 127 (1979).
44. Id. at 830, 262 S.E.2d 128.
45. Mayor & Council of Forsyth v. Hooks, 182 Ga. 78, 184 S.E. 724 (1936).
46. Miller v. Wells, 235 Ga. 411, 413, 219 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1975). See Pindar, Real Prop-
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ion in Hardigreedoes not show what evidence may have been offered to
resolve such an ambiguity, but it must have been obvious that some access to the highway was intended, and the court, while conceding "that
the parallel lines are not identified as a right-of-way, easement or roadway," concludes that "their existence can be interpreted reasonably only
as the designation of a roadway connecting appellee's property (Lot 23) to
the public highway."' 7 The remaining question is easier to answer. Mere
nonuse will not constitute abandonment.
Another narrow strip of land was involved in Wheatley Grading Contractors, Inc. v. DFT Investments, Inc.4' The strip was formerly a road,
but had been obstructed for years by debris and, more recently, by a
fence and gate. The court approved the order of the trial judge temporarily restraining the maintenance of the the fence by the defendant who
claimed title by abandonment of the road. The order also required the
removal of all recent obstructions. Traditionally in Georgia, "mandatory
injunctions" have been forbidden, 4 but are now permitted by the 1966
Civil Practice Act. 50 The rule, however, has never prevented a court from
restraining a continuous trespass even though the effect may be
mandatory. While it is no longer necessary to make such a distinction, we
cannot escape the conviction that had the trial judge ordered the removal
of a permanent building instead of a fence, he would not have been
affirmed.
When does an unpaved, narrow roadway, leading across several tracts
from one house to the highway, cease to be a mere private easement and
become a public road? In Horton v. Wayne County,5" the occupants of
the house were divorced about 1961. Under the divorce decree, the exwife continued to reside in the house and use the roadway. Since 1962,
the county, at her request, had been maintaining the road, although there
was no showing that it was officially registered as such." Since the period
was less than twenty years it had not become a public way by prescription, but the court considered the evidence sufficient to raise an inference
of implied dedication, even though it could not be proven that the landowner had ever expressly given the land or the easement to the county or
the public. Evidence of his acquiescence in the public use may be suffierty, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 28 MERCER L. REV. 207, 214 (1976).
47. 244 Ga. at 831, 262 S.E.2d at 128.
48. 244 Ga. 663, 664, 261 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1979).
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 55-110 (1974) (repealed 1966, see note 50 infra.).
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-201(f) (1977). See Atlanta Country Club v. Sanders, 230 Ga.
146, 195 S.E.2d 893 (1973).
51. 243 Ga. 789, 256 S.E.2d 775 (1979).
52. Former GA. CODE ANN. § 95-108, not repealed until 1973, required such registration
to bind the county, but failure to do so would not defeat the rights of the county according
to Jordan v. Way, 235 Ga. 496, 498, 220 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1975).
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cient to sustain a jury verdict of dedication, especially when accompanied
by years of maintenance at public expense.
The rule is well established that when a subdivider plats out lots over
his land, with a network of streets, parks, and other amenities for recreation and enjoyment, an implied easement arises in favor of each purchaser by the plat in the subdivision, for the use of all such streets or
facilities. The principle also applies to ocean beaches" and lake-front
lands." It has been said, however, that the subdivider is under no implied
obligation to "open up" streets and alleys, by grading or paving.55 In Sawyer v. Bush," the subdivider constructed a lake, and subdivided the adjoining lands for sale in lots. Later, the lake lost its water and grew up in
vegetation. The subdivider repaired the drains and refilled the lake without clearing it, thus creating a nuisance, breeding mosquitoes and reptiles. The court affirmed an order requiring the subdivider to remove all
vegetation from the lake, apparently assuming this to be his obligation as
such. Such an assumption runs counter to most general law, but the opinion may be sustained on the theory that one who undertakes to maintain
a lake (whether obligated to do so or not) must- not do it negligently.
For the erection of power lines or other utilities within the area of a
public highway, is the consent of the adjoining owner required? The question cannot arise as to highways acquired in fee by the public authority,
but those acquired by dedication or prescription are generally mere easements in favor of the public, leaving the base fee vested in the adjoining
owners with all rights of ownership not inconsistent with the rights of the
travelling public.5 7 There is a line of authority under which the owner's
permission must be obtained for the construction of utility lines in the
roadway.58 However the ancient rule is generally obstructive, and the
courts have learned that highway and street travel includes more than the
mere passage of vehicles and pedestrians. Overhead lines on poles, as well
as underground wires or pipes, are as much a part of the transportation
system as motor vehicles, often more efficient and more conserving in
time and expense. This fact was first perceived in the doctrine of "urban
servitudes," recognizing that city streets must carry much more than vehicles." Later, Georgia developed many metropolitan areas outside city
53.
54.
REAL

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 244 S.E.2d 559 (1978).
Segars v. Cornwell, 128 Ga. App. 245, 196 S.E.2d 341 (1973). See .G. PINDAR,
ESTATE LAW § 8-42 (1971).
Ford v. Harris, 95 Ga. 97, 102, 22 S.E. 144, 146 (1894).
244 Ga. 785, 262 S.E.2d 102 (1979).
Adair v. City of Atlanta, 124 Ga. 288, 291, 52 S.E. 739, 741 (1905).
Donalson v. Georgia Power Co., 175 Ga. 462, 467, 165 S.E. 440, 443 (1932).
City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756, 765, 13 S.E.2d 807, 811 (1941).

GA.
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limits, and Faulkner v. Georgia Power Co.,"0 involved such an area in
DeKalb County. The court rejected an attempt by the adjoining landowner to prevent the addition of higher voltage lines to those already in
the highway erected for the benefit of adjoining owners, and applied the
doctrine of "urban servitudes" to an outlying metropolitan area. The legislature has already gone along by authorizing counties to issue permits
for utilities on county roads.6 1
Does a reserved easement in a deed vest a mere personal right in the
grantor, or does the right pass to one who thereafter acquires the adjoining land reserved by the grantor? The question was answered in Feckoury
v. Askew," dealing with the provision that "both parties shall have free
use of the paved driveway leading into the . . . Mill."' "s Where the reservation concerns access to adjoining lands of the grantor it is not required
expressly to name the heirs and assigns of the grantor. The reservation
runs with the land like a covenant, because it relates to the use of the
land, and is more than a mere personal privilege. The case is also an apt
illustration of the other type of provision in that the grantor reserved the
right to use water from a well, but the right was limited, "so long as they
own the property herein reserved by them.""" Under the celebrated Rule
in Spencer's Case, the omission of reference to heirs and assigns is immaterial unless the covenant involved future constructions, or "things not in
esse." 6 A covenant does not run with the land unless it relates to the use
and enjoyment of the land itself, rather than a personal or collateral
covenant.
The phrase "easement of necessity" has two meanings. Where a landowner sells part of his land which is accessible only across the remaining
land, an implied easement of access across the remaining land also passes
to the purchaser. The other type exists where a landlocked owner applies
to a court for a grant of a private way for access to a public road across
adjacent lands. This grant is subject to compensation for the adjoining
owner in a manner similar to condemnation of public roads." This was
60. 243 Ga. 649, 650, 256 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1979).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 95A-402(f) (1976). See G. PINDAR, GA.REAL ESTATE LAW, supra, at
§ 5-21, 22 (1971).
62. '244 Ga. 128, 259 S.E.2d 70 (1979).
63. Id. at 129, 259 S.E.2d at 70.
64. Id. at 129, 259 S.E.2d at 71.
65. See G. PINDAR, GA. REAL ESTATE LAW § 22-11 (1971).
66. A number of other states have similar statutes:
Montana. In Montana the definition of "public uses" includes "Private roads leading
from highways to residences or farms." See Simonson v. McDonald, 131 Mont. 494, 497, 498,
311 P.2d 982, 984 (1957).
Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.01(2) (1979) provides that where a home or farm is
without access to a public or private road, the owner may have an easement over intervening
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the type involved in Kellett v. Salter,6 7 a proceeding brought under Georgia Code Ann. section 83-101 et. seq.5 The old statute enacted many
years ago was held unconstitutional in Cato v. Arnold,9 for failure to provide for compensation prior to the taking. The new statute70 was also
struck down in Arnold v. Selected Sites, Inc.,7 1 as to its prescribed
method of compensation, but the rest of the statute is saved by a general
statement that assessment of damages shall be as provided under the
general condemnation statute.71 Kellett makes no further challenge of the
statute, but deals with other problems. One defense was the contention
that the claimant had voluntarily landlocked himself by failing to reserve
access in selling off other parts of the land, but the court accepts the
rebuttal that although the claimant could have built himself a more
roundabout road across the lands formerly owned by him, the cost would
have exceeded the value of the land itself. The new statute permits a
defendant to show "other ways affording reasonably sufficient means of
access,"78 but in the court's opinion such a showing was not made.
Most landlocked landowners will find that the statute affords little relief even at its best. A developer will generally be unable to obtain zoning
clearances on the basis of a twenty-foot access road into a subdivision, as
74
limited by the act.
The statute providing for compulsory easements of necessity 5 again
76
came up for consideration in Department of Transportationv. Simon.
The defendant's land was condemned for a limited access highway, and
the same project effectively landlocked an adjacent tract owned by anlands. Upheld in Deseret Ranches of Fla. v. Bowman, 349 So. 2d 155 (1977).
Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 54-14-101, 102 (1980) provides for a proceeding in
county court to mark out a private road for landlocked proprietors across intervening lands
to a public road.
North Carolina.N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-68-71 (1974) authorizes "cartways" under similar circumstances. Waldroup v. Ferguson, 213 N.C. 198, 195 S.E. 615 (1938).
Private Purposes. Some courts have struck down such statutes as authorizing a taking
of private property for private purposes. See Beaudrot v. Murphy, 53 S.C. 118, 30 S.E. 825
(1898); Boyd v. C.L. Ritter Lumber Co., 119 Va. 348, 89 S.E. 273 (1916). And a condemnation by the state to establish a private driveway into land which has been landlocked by the
construction of a new highway has been denied. N.C. Highway Comm. v. Asheville School,
Inc., 276 N.C. 556, 173 S.E.2d 909 (1970).
67. 244 Ga. 601, 261 S.E.2d 597 (1979).
68. GA. CODE ANN. § 83-101 (1979).
69. 222 Ga. 567, 151 S.E.2d 149 (1966).
70. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 83-101 to 106.2 (1979).
71. 229 Ga. 468, 192 S.E.2d 260 (1972).
72. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-501 to 508 (1970).
73. 244 Ga. at 603, 261 S.E.2d at 599.
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 83-101(b) (1979).
75. GA. CODE ANN. § 83-101 to 106.2 (1979).
76. 151 Ga. App. 807, 261 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
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other party. Defendant felt certain that the other landowner would claim
an easement of necessity over defendant's remaining land and sought to
include this possibility in the list of damages to which she was entitled to
compensate for her own taking. The appellate court rejected this claim as
an element of damages and instead regarded it as an attempt to charge
the state for damages inflicted on property other than that owned by the
condemnee. There is no proximate cause relationship between the taking
of the condemnee's land and the land of the adjoining tract under a different ownership. In the absence of Georgia cases directly in point, the
court relied upon a fairly close precedent from Louisiana."
V. EMINENT DOMAIN
In a previous issue of this review,7 8 we discussed Heirs of W.L. Champion v. City of Atlanta,79 pointing out in the footnote that it had subsequently been reversed in the supreme court. The new opinion (with two
dissenting opinions) has now been published" and merits further comment. It is based upon the hazardous premise that a condemning body is
the exclusive judge of both the public's need to acquire property and the
amount to be taken. In addition, the court relied upon the Georgia eminent domain statute8 1 in finding that such matters are entirely within the
discretion of the legislature unless bad faith or abuse is shown. Such a
position is amply supported by general statements in previous decisions,
but overlooks the fact that the eniment domain power of the state cannot
be enlarged by mere statute beyond the constitutional limits of the fourteenth amendment. 8 An unconstitutional taking cannot be shielded by
any statutory presumption of legality, and if the taking is unnecessary, or
not for public use, it cannot be justified. It is significant that the court,
after planting its decision on the presumption of correctness, went on to
examine the evidence and found it sufficient to sustain the condemnor's
finding. The condemnor asked for a fee simple condemnation, but the
owners contended that there was need only for the surface and underground area; that they were entitled to retain the air rights above the
thirty-six foot level. Such a claim, if granted, would have wrought havoc
in highway construction, as well as other public works, and the court's
final ruling must be sustained on this basis. However, the dissenters correctly point out that the question of what constitutes a public use is one
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.

Department of Highways v. Smith, 353 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1977).
31 MERCER L. REv., supra, at 195 (1979).
149 Ga. App. 470, 254 S.E.2d 706 (1979).
City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion, 244 Ga. 620, 261 S.E.2d 343 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-603(a) (1970).
26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 38 (1966).
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of law for the courts, not one of fact.
VI.

ESTATES

The rule against perpetuities is encountered with some regularity in
perusing recent opinions. Lufburrow v. Williams8 was close enough to
draw three dissents, and close divisions are frequent on these points. A
deed contained what we call a "refusal," that is, the grantee (and "his
heirs or assigns") was prohibited from disposing of the land without first
offering it to "all living descendents of Stephen Bullman Lufburrow.""
The grantee retained title through his lifetime and devised the land to his
widow who also held under a deed of assent from herself as executrix. She
contracted to sell the land to a third party without offering it to the descendants, and the majority of the appellate court upheld her right to do
so, free of the refusal provisions in the deed, on the ground that they
violated the rule against perpetuities in failing to fix any time limit for
their exercise. The right of the "living descendants" is treated by the
court as a repurchase option similar to Gearhart v. West Lumber Co.,85
but the designated class of purchasers is subject to open and take without
limit of time. No implied limitations of the period could be found in the
deed. The dissenters support a construction fixing a definite class of descendants as of the date of delivery of the deed. However, the requirement was imposed not only on the grantee but expressly upon his "heirs
or assigns," and the price was to be the amount of the tax valuation (presumably) as of the date of the proposed sale. The words "then lineal descendants" have recently been construed as creating future interests not
fixed as of the effective date of the instrument."
The effect of the rule against perpetuities is largely for the public benefit in releasing land from deadhand restraints in the form of future interests which, if enforced, can offer unreasonable obstruction to free land
development.
Under the Georgia version of the Statute of Mortmain, 7 certain testamentary gifts are void. Gifts made to any charitable, educational, or civic
institution, to the exclusion of the testator's wife or children, which
amount to more than one-third of his estate and are executed less than
ninety days before death, are void. The statute does not apply to estates
of more than $200,000 in value. The new question in Citizens & Southern
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

152 Ga. App. 674, 263 S.E.2d 535 (1979).
Id. at 674, 263 S.E.2d at 536.
212 Ga. 25, 90 S.E.2d 10 (1955).
Walker v. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439, 440, 260 S.E.2d 338, 340 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-107 (1975).
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National Bank v. Martin" relates to the ninety day period. What is the
effect of a republication by codicil of a will dating prior to the period?
The court agreed with the trial judge that the republication rendered the
will effective as of the new date, which was within the ninety day period.
However, the additional finding of the judge, declaring an intestacy as to
the first $200,000 on the basis that the charitable devise exceeded onethird of the $200,000 limit, was reversed because it was not supported by
sufficient evidence.
A question not faced by the court is whether the statute perpetrates sex
discrimination, in that it applies only to male testators. Since our whole
legal system (indeed our whole civilization) is riddled with distinctions
between men and women, there seems to be no end to possible future
litigation in this area.

VII. LANDLINES AND BOUNDARIES
A metes and bounds description of land has been compared to a guided
tour along its marginal lines, conducted verbally by the writer of the
deed. Plats of survey are more graphic, but there is a tradition among
conveyancers not to be satisfied with a mere reference to an attached
plat; each line must be spelled out in words, even though additional pages
are added to the document for this purpose, and verbal errors inevitably
creep in. Boundary line disputes continue to occur, despite the greatest of
care, and Harrisv. McClain" is a good example. Even the best description is dependent upon having an acceptable beginning point; once fixed,
a line run to the next corner becomes a boundary. Surveyors, from long
experience, have various methods of finding boundary evidence and establishing lines. This if often done by reversing calls, or by recourse to
other surveys made in the vicinity, which show parallel or projected lines.
A court which rejects these ingenious devices in favor of the blatant
"know-it-all" recollection of old-timers, will probably end up in complete
error. This almost happened here, but the appellate court reversed, pointing out the absence of direct case law in Georgia, but accepting general
rulings that such collateral evidence should be admitted for what it may
be worth.9 1

88. 244 Ga. 522, 260 S.E.2d 901 (1979).
89. For reference to amendment of the law of tenancies in common in Georgia see, infra,
notes 167-189.
90. 152 Ga. App. 447, 263 S.E.2d 233 (1979).
91. See Hook v. Homer, 95 Idaho 657, 517 P.2d 554 (1973) (self-serving testimony);
Washington Nickel Mining & Alloys, Inc. v. Martin, 13 Wash. App. 180, 534 P.2d 59 (1975)
(lost corner); But cf. Dimaggio v. Cannon, 165 Conn. 11, 327 A.2d 561 (1973).
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In Westmoreland v. Beutell,"1 the deed description was: "Commencing
on the west bank of the Chattahoochee River at a corner. . at or near a
fork of said river, thence in an eastern direction across the river, thence in
a northern direction up said river to a white oak near the bank of said
river. '9 3 This was the upper Chattahoochee (not on the Alabama line
where the entire river is in Georgia). The appellate court recognized the
general rule that a deed running along a stream is bounded by the center
or main thread of the stream. Here the deed required that the line cross'
the river, then go "up said river" to a white oak, which indicated, but did
not expressly state, that the boundary included the entire stream. In view
of the uncertainty, the trial judge correctly admitted both parol evidence
to show what was intended, and proof of traditionary reputation."
VIII.

LIENS

In a previous issue,95 we discussed the complexities arising from
changes of title to property during construction, from the standpoint of
the proper filing of a claim, and whether the owner at the date of the
contract or at the date of filing should be named by the claimant." Another problem comes at a later point in time: when the change in title
occurs during the pendency of the suit for foreclosure of the lien. This
was the situation in Trust Company of New Jersey v. Atlanta Aluminum
Co.9' Four days after the lien was filed, the owners executed a security
deed, and thereafter the supplier brought an action against the contractor
and the owners for foreclosure of the lien. During the pendency of the
action, the security deed was foreclosed by sale under power, and the
property changed hands three times. The opinion deals with two
questions:
(a) Is the plaintiff in such an action required to take note of changes in
title during the litigation, and substitute defendants accordingly? The answer is no, and the court cites Oglethorpe Savings & Trust Co. v. Morgan.'8 Subsequent purchasers were charged with notice from the record of
the claim of a lien already filed, and were required to take appropriate
action for their own protection."
92. 153 Ga. App. 558, 266 S.E.2d 260 (1980).
93. Id. at 559, 266 S.E.2d at 261.
94. See Archer v. Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 233 U.S. 60 (1914) for discussion of
riverbed ownership rights.
95. 31 MERCER L. Rsv., supra, at 199 (1979).
96.- See A & A Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Burgess, 148 Ga. App. 859, 253
S.E.2d 246 (1979).
97. 149 Ga. App. 605, 255 S.E.2d 82 (1979).
98. 149 Ga. 787, 102 S.E.2d 528 (1919).
99. 149 Ga. App. at 608, 255 S.E.2d at 84.
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(b) Where the former owners, as defendants in the action, joined in a
consent judgment granting a lien to the plaintiff, is such a judgment
binding upon the present owner who was not a party to the proceeding?
The court answered in the affirmative. This conclusion follows from the
previous ruling that the plaintiff is not required to join new purchasers
during the litigation. The court also pointed out that the former owners
continued to have a vital interest in the litigation because the action
sought a personal judgment against them, and the consent judgment absolved them from personal liability. 0 0
There is another point not considered in the opinion. Under a 1939
statute,10 1 no suit involving real property operates as a lis pendens until a
required form of notice is filed. It has been held that a purchaser is not
charged with notice of a pending suit where notice is not filed.10s If the
purchaser is not charged with notice of the pending suit, is he not entitled
to assume, after the lapse of one year, that the claim of lien has not been
brought to suit? This is the practice among Georgia title attorneys."48
Certainly, as a matter of simple justice, the lien foreclosure statutes
should be amended to expressly require the filing of a lis pendens notice.
The claim of lien should also be required to name as the owner not only
the person having title when the materials are supplied, but also the owner at the time of filing, and when suit is filed, it should be required that
any subsequent purchaser be named as a defendant.
IX. MORTGAGES AND SECURITY DEEDS
A foreclosure by judicial sale in Georgia must be confirmed by the
court,108 but a confirmation of a nonjudicial sale under power is an entirely different proceeding. It is required, not for the validity of the sale,
but only for the purpose of permitting the secured creditor to pursue collection of a deficiency when the sale does not realize enough to pay the
secured debt.1 "6In Cheek v. Savannah Valley Production Credit Association,107 however, the nonjudicial sale by the Federal Land Bank of Co100. Id. at 609, 255 S.E.2d at 85.
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2801 (1967).
102.

Forester v. Young, 232 Ga. 365, 371, 207 S.E.2d 9, 13 (1974).

103. See TITLE STANDARDS, State Bar of Georgia, § 13.1: "A mechanics or materialmens
lien may be disregarded after lapse of the time within which suit for foreclosure may be filed
unless proceedings for its foreclosure have been commenced within such time and no release
shall be required by the title examiner."
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2002(3) (1967).
105. GA. CoDE ANN. § 67-201 (1967).
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1503 (1967); see G. PINDAR, GA. REAL ESTATE LAW § 20-58
(1971).
107. 244 Ga. 768, 262 S.E.2d 90 (1979).
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lumbia did not result in a deficiency, but raised a surplus over the secured debt of more than $29,000. The holder of a second security deed
filed an action claiming the surplus for its debt as a second lienholder.
The bank paid the excess money into the court and was discharged. The
borrower contended that his security deed to the bank expressly required
it to pay any surplus funds over to him. But the court took the position
that the surplus funds take the place of the property sold and become
subject to junior liens in lieu of the land sold. This means, in effect, that
the execution of a second loan deed by the original borrower transfers his
right to surplus funds whether or not expressly stated. 08
Several difficult questions of mortgage law arose in Bryant v. Randal, 1 9 an action to enjoin foreclosure of a land development project in
which the appellate court was divided by dissenting and concurring opinions. The trial judge ruled that where the manager of a land syndication,
which had assumed two outstanding loans, personally obtained an assignment of the first loan and sought to foreclose it, he could not validly foreclose because the assignment to him satisfied it, promoting the second
loan to full priority. A majority of the appellate court disagreed, despite
the fact that although the manager never told the members of the syndicate what he had done, he had subsequently reimbursed himself out of
syndicate funds and rents. The members of the syndicate had executed
among themselves a cotenancy agreement naming him as manager and
agent, but the holders of the second loan were not parties to this agreement and could not claim any rights under it. The manager stood in no
fiduciary relationship to the junior lenders under which they could claim
rights of priority, and his own principals, the investors in the syndicate,
made no complaint. No fraud had been practiced upon the junior lenders,
who were the only plaintiffs before the court.
Several years ago the Georgia Supreme Court, in Old Stone Mortgage
& Realty Trust v. New Georgia Plumbing, Inc.," 0 embraced a startling
doctrine, well supported by decisions and texts over the country, which
enlarges the effect of a subordination agreement so as to promote to priority not only the junior lien specifically dealt with, but also all other
intervening liens that were superior to the junior lien. The stated rationale was that if the senior lienholder is allowed arbitrarily to select one of
108. East Atlanta Bank v. Limbert, 191 Ga. 486, 12 S.E.2d 865 (1941). See also Roth v.
Eisinger Mill & Lumber Co., 70 F.2d 294 (App. D.C. 1934); OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF MORTGAGES § 343 (2d ed. 1970); Mattel v. Conant, 156 Mass. 418, 31 N.E. 487
(1892); Eliason v. Sidle, 61 Minn. 285, 63 N.W. 730 (1895). For reference to recent amendments to the Georgia law on open-end mortgages, assumptions, and acceleration of maturity, see, infra, notes 140-151.
109. 244 Ga. 676, 261 S.E.2d 602 (1979).
110. 239 Ga. 345, 346, 236 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1977).
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several junior liens for priority, he could thus destroy all other intervening liens.' As a corollary, the court limited the rule to cases where the
subordinating lienor has actual notice of the intervening lien."' The opinion also seems to leave a possible (but dubious) loophole where the language used in the subordination is expressly limited to the one lien, so
that the subordinator is seen as "merely switching positions in the scale
3
of priorities.""1
The question again arose in Commercial Bank v. Stafford."" A landowner had first given a loan deed to A, and there followed an entry of
judgment against him in favor of B. Another loan deed was then given to
C, accompanied by a subordination from A. If the principle of Old Stone
Mortgage & Realty is accepted, this should have promoted B to priority
over A. But a new fact has been added: the indebtedness to C has since
been fully paid, and by statute," 6 title revests in no way "affected by any
liens, incumbrances, or rights which would otherwise attach to the property by virtue of the title being in the grantee. . . ...
I' The subordination agreement became functus officio upon satisfaction of C's loan, and
there is no subject matter on which it can operate." 7 The opinion of Chief
Judge Deen characterizes the rule as "merely an equitable manner of
solving the problem of circuity of liens. ' "8
If the rule is accepted as operating only so long as the second loan remains unpaid-and this position is difficult to combat-then it is only a
temporary priority which is accorded to intervening liens, which may be
lost at any time by payment of the second loan. This, however, is no more
than other lienholders may expect.""
The federal farm loan system features local associations working under
20
the Federal Land Banks. In Boling v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia,'
the association wished to make a loan far in excess of the $150,000 limit
imposed by the land bank. A plan was devised under which the land was
cut into smaller tracts and various persons were induced to pose as bor-

111. Id. at 346, 236 S.E.2d at 593.
112. Id. at 345, 236 S.E.2d at 593.
113. Id. at 347, 236 S.E.2d at 594.
114. 149 Ga. App. 736, 256 S.E.2d 69 (1979).
115. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1307 (1967).
116. 149 Ga. App. at 737, 256 S.E.2d at 70.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 738, 256 S.E.2d at 70.
119. Satisfaction of the lien promoted by the subordination agreement has been regarded as terminating the agreement. See Taylor v. Wing, 84 N.Y. 471 (1881). Even where
the original rule applies the promoted lien gains priority only to the extent of the amount
due on the prior subordinated lien. Wayne Int. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Moats, 149 Ind. 123,
48 N.E. 793 (1897).
120. 243 Ga. 467, 254 S.E.2d 848 (1979).
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rowers. The real borrower, however, agreed to indemnify them by taking
over each loan after closing and obtaining their release from personal liability. But things went wrong, and the association began foreclosure. The
nominal borrowers sought an injunction, claiming fraud and deceit, and
the supreme court affirmed a denial of the relief sought. The facts present
a typical case of pari delicto, and the court correctly applied the "clean
hands" doctrine-"" The court commented that appellant-plaintiffs
claimed to be the victims of misrepresentations made by the bank's officers and "would like to isolate [those] representations from the overall
scheme and thus escape liability on the notes they executed. Unfortunately for appellants, the evidence showed the entire scheme was well
known to them and they did not rely upon the bank officer's
representation."" 2
It would seem logical for a lender to release parts of the land as partial
payments are made, in proportion to the gradual debt reduction, but the
law does not require it unless expressly provided in the mortgage or security deed, since the lender is entitled to retain all the security until full
payment is made.'" In Cassville-White Association v. Bartow Association,"2 4 a separate release agreement was executed at the closing, along

with the purchase-money security deed. Although neither instrument referred to the other, they were contemporaneous documents, part of the
same transaction, and the court's position must be correct that the doctrine of merger by deed is inapplicable. The existence of a simultaneous
release contract obviously intended to be subsequently performed, sufficed to insure its survival after the closing.
There is a Georgia statute regulating nonjudicial sales in foreclosure of
mortgages and security deeds which requires that the sale "shall be advertised and conducted at the time and place and in the usual manner of
sheriff's sales in the county in which the real estate, or part therof, is
located.''28 There was a question of grammar in Butler v. Forsyth County
Bank. 2 ' It was contended that the time of sale must be in the usual manner of sheriff's sales in that particular county of sale, and the sale (although held during the legal hours of sale) was not held at the usual and
customary time in Forsyth County. Obviously, such a contention would
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-104 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 598 (1932); MacRae
v. MacRae, 37 Ariz. 307, 294 P. 280 (1930); Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1952).
122. 243 Ga. at 469, 254 S.E.2d at 850.
123. Dodd v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of Statesboro, 226 Ga. 516, 518, 175 S.E.2d
662, 664 (1970); Taylor v. Thomas, 61 Ga. 472, 475 (1878).
124. 150 Ga. App. 561, 258 S.E.2d 175 (1979).
125. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1506 (1967).
126. 153 Ga. App. 122, 264 S.E.2d 502 (1980).
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impose more than 150 different rules for conducting foreclosure sales in
Georgia, and we should be grateful to the court for rejecting the argument. Since the statute' 1 7 authorizes sales between ten a.m. and four
p.m., the fact that the sheriff may have habitually conducted his sales at
ten or eleven a.m. was immaterial.
X.

REAL ESTATE BROKERS

The Real Estate Brokerage Act of 1974, as amended, 128 came up for
construction in Berchenko v. Fulton Federal Savings & Loan Associa2 9
tion.1
The Act first outlines a massive coverage' " which appears
designed to subject any and all persons involved in real estate transactions, but then proceeds to enumerate ten exceptions"3 ' which are also
rather broad. Plaintiff claimed exemption as a "referral agent" claiming a
finder's fee for bringing forward a purchaser. The court quoted the statute defining a broker (including a referral agent) as one who receives, or
with the intent or expectation of receiving a fee, charges a commission or
any other valuable consideration for his services. However, it was recognized by the legislators that certain activities were routinely carried out
by regularly employed persons incidental to the purchase or sale of real
estate, and these persons might be technically violating the law. Hence,
the exceptions in section 84-1403. Under exception (i), one who merely
refers one person to another is exempt, but looking back to the definition,1 3 2 a referral agent receiving or intending to receive a fee for his services must have a license. Thus, in the court's majority view, the Act was
intended to tax all such agents except those acting gratuitously. Since
three justices did not join in the opinion, perhaps the legislature should
3
amend to avoid further question.1

XI.

REAL ESTATE SALES

CONTRACTS

In 1961 the Georgia Supreme Court accepted without reservation or exception the broad doctrine that a fiduciary can not bind his estate by
executing an option, unless expressly so authorized in the instrument creating his office.' 3 The rule is one of general law throughout the coun127. GA. CODE ANN. § 39-1206 (1975).
128. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-14 (1979).
129. 244 Ga. 733, 261 S.E.2d 643 (1979).
130. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1401 (1979).
131. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1403 (1979).
132. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1401 (1979).
133. Reference is made to the 1980 amendments to the licensing laws of Georgia pertaining to real estate brokers and salesmen. See notes 167-180 supra.
134. Adler v. Adler, 216 Ga. 553, 118 S.E.2d 456 (1961).
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try,' 5 but there are many exceptions in other states which have not yet
been recognized in Georgia.' 8 In Phillips v. Sexton,8 7 the court again
gave its full approval to the general rule, invalidating an option executed
by the proposed seller, individually and as executor, under his wife's will.
Examining the will, the court found it authorized the executor individually to sell any property of the estate, but confined his estate to one for
life, with remainder to a daughter. As a power to destroy the remainder
interest of the daughter, it vested in him as a fiduciary and became subject to the rule in Adler v. Adler. One justice concurred only in the judgment, and the case is indeed a close one.
Golden v. Frazier" is of special interest to land litigants. This was a
typical action by a seller for specific performance against the buyers, who
defaulted because of a "change in plans." As one of the more predictable
rulings, the court agreed with the trial judge that an outstanding encumbrance on the property at the closing would not defeat the seller's right to
demand performance, where he obtained a cancellation from the bank as
of the date of closing.' 8 Nor was the contract unenforceable because of
an error in the land lot number where the remaining description of the
property sufficiently identified it. There was a question about the earnest
money of $750, which was deposited with the broker under the contract
provision that he may pay seller half the earnest money if "seller claims
balance as seller's liquidated damages in full settlement of any claim for
damages."' 0 Under this language it was immaterial whether the seller
"claimed" part or all of the earnest money since the broker never paid
out any of it except as a deposit in court. The principal point at issue in
the case was the alleged inconsistency of a grant of specific performance
with a verdict for damages and attorneys' fees, which the court rejected in
reliance upon Corbin on Contracts."' The final point of interest was the
typical contract clause that shifts liability for the broker's commission to
the buyer where he fails or refuses to perform. No such shift can occur,
says the court, where the contract is enforced, even though there was no
voluntary performance by the buyer.

135. Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1310, 1312 (1962); Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 312 Mo.
552, 281 S.W. 744 (1925); Hickok v. Still, 168 Pa. 155, 31 A. 1100 (1895).
136.

See Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1310, 1312 (1962).

137.

243 Ga. 501, 504, 255 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1979).

138.

244 Ga. 685, 261 S.E.2d 703 (1979).

139.

Willingham Loan & Trust Co. v. Moore, 160 Ga. 550, 128 S.E. 751 (1925).

140.

244 Ga. at 686-87, 261 S.E.2d at 705.

141.

5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1222 (1964).
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RECORD NOTICE

In Insilco Corp. v. Carter,42 a house was built on land not owned by
the builder, but he gave a duly recorded mortgage on it to the supplier to
cover building costs. Then, without ever acquiring title to the land, the
builder moved the house to another tract, one actually owned by him, and
proceeded to sell and convey it to Carter, the appellee. The legal results
are somewhat unusual. The builder had title to the building despite his
status as a wrongdoer, even without owning the land on which it originally stood, 1 3 and the mortgage holder acquired his title to the building
upon removal to land owned by the builder."' The question was whether
the mortgage holder could assert his rights against Carter, who bought
without notice of the mortgage or the previous location of the house. If he
had checked the records for the two years prior to the deed into the
builder, to the land on which the house finally stood, he would have
found a mortgage describing other land, even though his house then stood
on it. However, the recording statutes of Georgia do not require an examiner to search records prior to the party's acquisition of title. This is the
general rule throughout the country, and adopted by Georgia in Middle
Georgia Realty, Inc. v. IDS Homes, Inc.145 The application of the rule to
the peculiar facts in the present case has all the elements of a beautiful
bar examination question.
XIII. TAXATION OF LAND
What constitutes a taxable estate in land is one of the recurring
problems which appellate courts face, and generally involves a lease of
public lands (basically tax-free) for private purposes. In Allright Parking
of Georgia, Inc. v. Joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors,146 the court
analyzed the provisions of a bulky document of this type in the light of
previous rulings 47 and determined that it created a mere usufruct, not an
estate in land, and was not subject to ad valorem taxes. The lease was for
the operation of parking facilities on ten acres of uptown viaduct property. Lessee could erect no improvements without lessor's consent, and
142. 254 Ga. 513, 265 S.E.2d 794 (1980).
143. The house became personalty when detached from the original tract. Kennedy v.
Smith, 149 Ga. 61, 99 S.E. 27 (1919).
144. A mortgage holder acquires all rights of the grantor in such property when detached. Cunningham v. Cureton, 96 Ga. 489, 23 S.E. 420 (1895).
145. 231 Ga. 57, 200 S.E.2d 141 (1973).
146. 244 Ga. 378, 260 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
147. The court refers back to Camp v. Delta Airlines, 232 Ga. 37, 205 S.E.2d 194 (1974)
and other authorities. See 30 MEaCER L. Rzv., supra, at 207 (1978); 27 MERCER L. REV. 187
(1975).
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lessee had rights of subletting and transfer with lessor's written consent.
Various provisions indicated an estate, but others suggested a usufruct.
Lessor was not required to repair, and lessee was to maintain insurance
and pay all taxes due on the property. The controlling provision was one
under which lessor had sole discretion to determine what part of the
premises lessee could use. The court held that the lease, read as a whole,
contained such restrictions on use as were "fundamentally inconsistent
with the concept of an estate for years,M4 8 and the lessee's interest was
therefore not taxable.
XIV.

YEAR'S SUPPORT

The Georgia law of year's support, under which land may be awarded
in fee to the widow alone, or to the widow and the minor children, for her
or their support during the first year after the husband's death (and
sometimes for second or third years), has gone through a number of
changes in recent years, in both the courts and the legislature. Under the
Act of 1979,"'" all discrimination as to sex was removed, and any surviving spouse, husband or wife, may claim equal rights under the statute.
The act leaves several questions to be settled. For example, is there a
presumption of dependency of a husband upon the wife as in the reverse
situation? In 1866 Chief Justice Lumpkin asked, "What is the object of
the law . . .? It is to prevent a family being turned away homeless - a
widow and children - and cast upon the world in their forlorn condition ' "5 0 Will a surviving husband now be required to prove dependency?
Similar changes have been made in the alimony laws.
The Georgia Supreme Court has settled another question in this field.
In Pierce v. Moore,'5 ' an award of land was made to a widow alone. She
bought materials for remodelling a restaurant on the land (presumably
after the date of the award), and upon her failure to pay, a personal judgment was obtained against her and levied on the land. She claimed exemption from levy in that the debt was not created for her maintenance
and support. The court held that the land had not been exempt since
1937, for the reason that under the statute of that year,' title vested in
her "in fee, without restriction as to use, incumbrance, or disposition. ' "'
Thus, the problems presented in older cases have now been eliminated.'5
148.
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244 Ga. at 387, 260 S.E.2d at 321.
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Blassingame v. Rose, 34 Ga. 418, 421 (1866).
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ZONING

The phrase "spot zoning" has acquired a reprehensible flavor, but it is
not expressly prohibited under most zoning systems. Yet, a rezoning act,
or the grant of a variance that creates an island of nonconformity, such as
a shop in an all-residential area, is generally objectionable as granting
special privileges to one landowner that are denied to his neighbors, and
as violating the concept of a "comprehensive plan," which is the basis of
all zoning.155 Justice Marshall, in East Land, Inc. v. Floyd County, " has
contributed an interesting opinion on the subject, well-deserving of respect in the national field, but, like most other efforts to work out reliable
thumb-rules on the subject, it again gives no all-inclusive criteria or
guidelines. The case dealt with a 120-acre tract of country land on which
the developer planned to erect apartment houses. The county had zoning
powers, but only two percent of its unincorporated area was zoned. Notwithstanding this fact, neighboring landowners were able to obtain a special county ordinance zoning the particular lot as "low density residential," thus prohibiting the erection of apartments. The statute authorizing
county and municipal zoning "57 permitted the authority to divide areas
into districts "of such number, shape, and size as it may determine," but
the intention, as the court pointed out, was "to give local governing authorities the leeway to engage in creativity and flexibility in the zoning
process. It should not be read as a license to discriminate. '15 8 In striking
down the ordinance (and overruling seven prior decisions), the supreme
court left open a number of questions for the future. If the county, instead of selecting one land lot for zoning, had zoned a larger area in the
same manner, would the discriminatory onus be lifted? How large must
the area be? Planners are now saying that the day of the large suburban
single-family dwelling is passing, as land becomes scarce; that the
prejudice against apartments is part of "snob zoning" designed to give the
advantage to wealthy landowners and some courts have invalidated exclusionary zoning for reasons along this line.' " However, the United States
Supreme Court is not committed to this view. As far back as 1926, it
pointed out that "very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive sur-

658, 151 S.E. 336 (1929); and Houston v. Phillips, 159 Ga. 344, 125 S.E. 713 (1924).
155. See Hardin v. Croft, 20 Ga. 115, 60 S.E.2d 395 (1950), and Barton v. Hardin, 204
Ga. 108, 48 S.E.2d 882 (1948).
156. 244 Ga. 761, 262 S.E.2d 51 (1979).
157. GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1208 (1976).
158. 244 Ga. at 765, 262 S.E.2d at 54.
159. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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roundings created by the residential character of the district."1 0 And recently, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development
Corp., ' the Court rejected a claim of racial discrimination as the motive
for denial of zoning for low-cost housing. The Court said that, although
the denial may have racial effects since minorities comprised eighteen
percent of the population in the Chicago area, and the particular section
(Arlington Heights) had almost no minority residents while forty percent
of the eligible group of prospective tenants were of minority races, there
was no evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor. Perhaps we
should get back to basics and not use zoning either to perpetuate the
country club style of life or to integrate minorities. Zoning was originally
justified as an exercise of the police power which was used to exclude
industrial and commercial activities in residential areas; to increase the
safety and security of home life; to protect children from accidents in
congested traffic; to reduce noises, odors, and behavior producing nervous
conditons; to aid in firefighting; and to allow more air, sunshine, vegetation, and recreation space.' 62 If it merely transfers city slums and ghettos
into the country, what have we gained?
The encroachment of commercial buildings into residential areas was
the subject of DeKalb County v. Flynn. 63 The 11.2 acre tract in question
was denied rezoning from residential to commercial although almost surrounded by property already occupied by business enterprises such as
restaurants and shopping centers. The owner held a sales contract for
$275,000 contingent on obtaining commercial rezoning. He contended
that denial was an unconstitutional taking of his property without compensation under the doctrine of Barrett v. Hamby.' 6 The county contended, on the contrary, that twelve residences backing up on the tract
would be depreciated by a stated percent, and that this constituted a
"damage done to the community." The appellate court disagreed: Even if
home values are diminished to some extent, this fact does not establish
community damage. The burden finally rested on the county to justify
the zoning after the complaining landowner proved it substantially deprived him of his property. The burden was not carried, and the trial
judge had found as a fact that the land was unsuited to the required residential use. Nevertheless, it becomes increasingly clear that Barrett v.
Hamby has raised more questions than it answered.
"Strip zoning" was considered as something to be avoided in Hubert
160.
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Realty Co. v. Cobb County Board of Commissioners.1 5 Here, long strips
of commercial activity along arterial streets made it difficult to maintain
the residential character of the neighborhood. Hence, the planners tried
to establish firm cutoff points for the commercial rezoning, with special
reference to shopping centers. The residential development, however,
could be forced off the arterial street by denial of curb cuts made so that
all homes must front on interior streets. The practice was reviewed by the
court on a claim that denial of rezoning for a shopping center was an
uncontitutional taking under Barrett v. Hamby.'" The court reviewed
the method outlined above and accepted it as constitutionally reasonable,
and bearing a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality
and general welfare. The applicant failed to show an arbitrary confiscation of his property by the denial of his proposed development.
XVI.

LEGISLATION AFFECTING REALTY

Under an Act of 1979,16 acceleration of a loan secured by residential
real estate because of a transfer of the property or an assumption of the
loan by a new purchaser is prohibited, as is the disapproval of an assumption by a creditworthy purchaser. The act fixes maximum transfer fees
and interest increases. It was amended in 1980168 to exclude loans made
by an employer to an employee as an employment benefit.
The Act of 1980 "0 limits the effect of open-end clauses in mortgages or
security deeds so as to invalidate further advances (except those made to
preserve the property) after the borrower transfers the property by record
conveyance and gives actual notice by mail to the holder. It also redefines
"original parties" to include any corporation into which the grantee shall
be merged or consolidated.
There is an Act 170 amending Georgia Code Ann. section 67-1305.1,171 to
permit lenders having federally insured deposits to withhold their transfers from record in certain cases where they continue to service the loan.
The 1980 amendment to the tenancy in common law172 appears to be
limited in its effect to corporate shares and securities, and joint deposit
17
accounts.
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Under the 1980 Condominium Act amendment," 4 the Act of 1975,176
section 43(b) and (c) is amended to substitute a right of recission for outright invalidation in the case of sales not in compliance with the required
disclosure. The same act was also amended"' to deal with conversion of
condominiums, with notice to and rights of tenants, with information to
be furnished purchasers, and with other matters.
The act regulating real estate brokers177 was amended under the 1980
Act178 by changing the definition of "referral broker," and revising the
qualifications and entrance requirements for brokers, associate brokers,
and sales persons.
7
There is a 1980 amendment to the Real Estate Transfer Tax Law1
granting various exemptions, most of which are already in effect. It
should be noted, however, that any instrument is exempt to which "any
public authority or any nonprofit corporation"' 80 is a party. This may enlarge the existing exemption to include churches, schools, foundations,
hospitals, and other similar institutions and organizations.
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